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ABSTRACT 
 
 
Leung and Horwitz (2004) argued that the failing of corporate governance and lack of 
transparency are often associated with the Asian financial crisis. Therefore, this study 
attempt to examine the relationship between independent non-executive directors and 
managerial ownership towards firm performance, as measured by Tobin’s Q. Sample 
consisted of 220 Main Board companies listed on the Bursa Malaysia in the year 
2003. The study found the number of independent non-executive directors that on the 
board does not contribute to firm performance. The study also reveals that the 
compliance level of one-third of independent directors to PLCs as required by Bursa 
Malaysia’s listing requirement is satisfactory. Using piecewise linear regression 
analysis, this study captured non-linear relationship between managerial ownership 
and Tobin’s Q. However, the interaction effects between independent non-executive 
directors and managerial ownership on firm performance was not found to be 
significant.  
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ABSTRAK 
 
 
Leung dan Horwtiz (2004) menerangkan kegagalan tadbirurus korporat dan 
kekurangan transparensi selalunya dikaitkan dengan krisis kewangan di Asia. Justeru 
itu, kajian ini meninjau perhubungan di antara pengarah bebas bukan eksekutif 
(INEDs) dan pemilikan pengurus syarikat terhadap prestasi firma. Kajian ini 
menggunakan model Tobin Q sebagai proksi untuk prestasi firma. Sebanyak 220 
syarikat dipilih dari senaraian Bursa Malaysia Kuala Lumpur (BSKL) yang tertumpu 
pada papan utama bagi tahun 2003. Hasil kajian ini, mendapati bilangan pengarah 
bebas bukan eksekutif tidak menyumbangkan terhadap prestasi firma. Kajian ini juga 
menunjukkan semua syarikat mematuhi aras pematuhan iaitu satu pertiga daripada 
lembaga pengarah terdiri daripada pengarah bebas bukan eksekutif yang ditetapkan 
oleh keperluan penyenaraian BSKL. Keputusan ini dianggap memuaskan. Dengan 
menggunakan analisis regresi cebis demi cebis, keputusan menunjukkan bahawa 
perhubungan di antara pemilikan syarikat dan prestasi firma adalah tidak linear. 
Walau bagaimanapun, kesan interaksi di antara bilangan pengarah bebas bukan 
eksekutif dan pemilikan pengurus syarikat tidak menunjukkan signifikan terhadap 
prestasi firma.  
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Chapter 1 
INTRODUCTION 
 
1.1 Introduction 
This chapter introduces the research outline of the study. The chapter illustrates the 
background of the study, problem statement, research objectives and questions, 
significance of the study and organization of the remaining chapters. 
 
1.2 Background 
Leung and Horwitz (2004) argued that the failing of corporate governance and lack of 
transparency are often associated with the Asian financial crisis. Public listed 
companies in Malaysia like other Asian firms have concentrated managerial 
ownership. Thus, the burden and responsibility fall on the board of directors to 
enhance and drive the company towards success. The corporate governance studies 
also highlight the composition of board of directors as an important aspect in 
protecting the interest of shareholders, especially in transactions where the interest of 
managers and outside shareholders may depart.    
Aligned with these objectives, the Malaysian Code on Corporate Governance 
(2001) requires at least one-third of a board to comprise of independent directors. In 
addition, it stipulates that independent directors take the lead in certain board 
committee. This is why independent directors have a pivotal role in the Malaysian 
corporate sectors. These directors are expected to look after the interest of the 
minority shareholders, which requires vigilance, integrity and good understanding of 
how business works (The Star, 2004). As such, they ought to be top-notch managers 
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so as to be able to pass the often intense shareholder scrutiny. Yet, this is not so in 
practice. 
On the other hand, managerial ownership plays an important role in the 
corporate governance literature. The responsibility of running the company is the duty 
of the company’s CEO and its board of directors. However, the recurring criticism is 
that many corporate management often do not behave in the manner consistent with 
the shareholder’s objectives. Unfortunately, some management may act more in their 
own interests than in those of the shareholders. It has been recently suggested that the 
board’s control over management should ensure the company’s success. However, the 
board’s lack of independence impedes that intention.   
 
1.3 Problem Statement 
This study tries to investigate how the independent non-executive directors and 
managerial ownership enhance firm performance. The board of director’s vital 
contribution is to monitor and screen management decision. In consequence to that, it 
is imperative to have outside directors, chiefly independent director on the board to 
secure better monitoring of the board and eventually containing managerial 
opportunism (Fama, 1980; Fama & Jensen, 1983 as cited in Eng & Mak, 2003). The 
question arises as to why we need outside directors on the board? Research done by 
Rhoades, Rechner and Sundramurthy (2000) found that outside directors have better 
influence over management and conflict of interest as compared to inside directors. 
This is mainly because they are financially independent, have an aptitude to isolate 
management and decision making process. Daily, Johnson and Dalton (1999) added 
that inclusion the of outside directors are more likely to support the interests of 
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shareholders and to execute monitor and control functions, as well as replacing the 
CEO, reviewing managerial decision and performance.  
Byrd and Hickman (1992) stated that both inside and outside directors have 
their own strengths. Insider directors provide specialized knowledge and valuable 
information for the daily company operations, while outside directors may add both 
expertise and objectivity in assessing the manager’s decisions.  The corporate board, 
with the mix of expertise, independence, and legal power, is a potentially powerful 
governance mechanism. Thus the existence of outside directors (independent) in the 
board will enhance better performance.  
A number of empirical researches have been done on the relationship between 
governance mechanisms. One line of research examines the empirical relationship 
between managerial ownership and firm performance (Akimova & Schwodiauer, 
2004; Davies, Hillier & McColgan, 2002; Demsetz & Villalonga, 2001; Morck, 
Shleifer & Vishny, 1988). Other studies on corporate governance attributes includes 
the proportion or existence of independent directors and firm performances (Peng, 
Buck, & Filatotchev, 2003; Weir & Laing, 2001; Clarke, 1998; Forker, 1992 & 
Fosberg, 1989) Even so, studies have also been done between managerial ownership 
and outside directors towards firm performance (Peasnell, Pope, & Young, 2001; 
Faccio & Lasfer, 2000; Barnhart & Rosenstein, 1998; Mallette & Fowler, 1992).  
In the Malaysian literature, studies have been conducted on the direct 
relationship between board structure and ownership structure towards firm 
performance. To our knowledge, no study has looked into the perspective of 
interaction between independent non-executive director and managerial ownership 
towards firm performances, particularly in Malaysian context. Therefore, this study 
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investigates whether the interaction between managerial ownership and independent 
non-executive directors has any impact on the firm performance. 
 
1.4 Research Objectives 
Therefore, this study attempts to accomplish four main objectives as follows: 
(1) To determine whether the proportion of independent non-executive directors 
on corporate board influence firm performance. 
(2) To examine whether managerial ownership influence firm performance. 
(3) To examine the proportion of independent non-executive directors and 
managerial ownership on firm performance. 
(4) To investigate the interaction effects between independent non-executive 
directors and managerial ownership on firm performance. 
 
1.5 Research Questions 
In order to achieve the above mentioned objectives, this study will try to answer the 
following research questions;  
(1) Whether the higher proportion of independent non-executive directors on 
corporate boards has an impact on firm performance? 
(2) Whether managerial ownership structures have an impact on firm 
performance? (non-linear relationship) 
(3) Whether the higher proportion of independent non-executive directors and 
different levels of managerial ownership have an impact on firm performance? 
(4) Whether the interaction effects between the higher proportion of independent 
non-executive directors and different levels of managerial ownership have an 
impact on firm performance? 
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1.6 Definition of Key Terms 
Before further discussion, it is necessary to redefine terms used throughout the study. 
It will be pertinent to share a common understanding of the concepts such as financial 
performance, independent non-executive directors, and the managerial structures.   
 
1.6.1 Financial Performance 
The Tobin’s Q is a measure of market performance and computed as (market 
value of equity + total liabilities) divided by total assets. 
 
1.6.2 Independent Non-Executive Directors 
Stock Exchange of Hong Kong Limited define the independent non-executive 
directors as directors who do not have the administrative or management 
responsibilities in a company, without any direct relations which could interfere with 
the exercise of independent judgment with the management and do not have any 
interests other than the remuneration paid by the company.  
 
1.6.3 Managerial Ownership   
Managerial ownership is measured as the proportions of director’s equity 
ownership as proxy for managerial share ownership, which includes their deemed 
interest. 
 
1.7 Significance of Study 
This study is important since it will help to provide feedback to PLCs on how to 
improve the quality of boards. Besides, the emergence of AFTA and globalization is a 
challenge to PLCs in Malaysia to plan and prepare to compete with international 
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companies. For this reason PLCs need to strengthen their corporate governance in 
order to be standardized with the international corporate governance.  
This paper will contribute to both theory and practice in the area of corporate 
governance. Agency theory enhances the interests between the managers and 
shareholders to raises firm value. On the other hand, regulatory bodies, practitioners, 
shareholders, and managers will benefited with up-to-date information, particularly in 
the area of board effectiveness, its impact on the firm performance. 
Appointing independent directors will tap a reservoir of talent and skills that 
will enhance the level of corporate governance in Malaysia and in improving the 
performance of Malaysian companies. Their experience and expertise, both are in a 
position to add considerable value to the company. Additionally, independent 
directors bring diversity and breadth of experience to the operation of a company 
board and to enhance the formulation of strategy and its execution.  
Besides, understanding the existence of independent directors in managerial 
ownership structures will shed light on the governance and control process of firms. 
This study will help and provide better understanding of the independent directors and 
managerial ownership in Malaysian companies. It is also hoped that the findings of 
this study would contribute to the literature of independence of boards’ effectiveness 
and managerial ownership. Finally, this study might help policy makers to improve 
corporate governance structure in Malaysian context.  
 
1.8 Organization of Remaining Chapters 
This study is structured mainly in five chapters with chapter one on introduction of 
the study as well as overview of the study. Chapter two reviews the literatures which 
outlines previous research undertaken in relation to independent non-executive 
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directors, managerial ownership and firm performances. The data and variables 
section which discusses the sample and defines the variables will be presented in 
chapter three. The result section in chapter four will argue the empirical analysis of 
the sample and will test the hypotheses. Finally, chapter five illustrates the discussions 
and conclusions of the study.    
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Chapter 2 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
2.1 Introduction 
In order to obtain a better understanding of this study, a comprehensive search of the 
past literature reveals that several studies have been undertaken to examine the 
relationship between independent non-executive directors and managerial ownership 
towards firm performances. This chapter discusses several issues, namely, 
independent non-executive directors, managerial ownership and firm performances.     
 
2.2 Literature Overview 
The subject of corporate governance became fashionable in the last decade of the 20
th
 
century and gathered within its parameters manifold issues relating to corporate and 
company law. The Cadbury Report (1992) defines corporate governance as systems in 
which companies are directed and managed. More specifically in the Malaysian 
context,  The Finance Committee on Corporate Governance (1999) describes 
corporate governance as “the process and structure used to direct and manage the 
business and affairs of the company towards enhancing business prosperity and 
corporate accountability with the ultimate objective of realizing long term 
shareholders value, taking into account the interests of other stakeholders”. (pg. 10) 
Selected committees, comprising distinguished personalities, have already 
issued comprehensive reports on the subject in Britain, Australia, South Africa and 
Canada. The Cadbury, Hampel, Bosch, Day and King Reports are samples (Thomas, 
2002). In Malaysia, the High-Level Finance Committee issued a detailed report on the 
subject in February 1999. Later, in March 2000, the Finance Committee released the 
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amended Malaysian Code on Corporate Governance. Indeed, one of the amended 
codes is clarifies and enhances the definition of independent directors.  
Daily and Dalton (2003) stated that “board independence is like a lighthouse 
on a dark and stormy night. It serves as the beacon of hope for corporate governance 
reform activists who embrace the perspective that more independent boards will 
results in greater oversight of corporate management and that this, in turn, will lead 
to improved firm performance” (pg. 41). As such, much of the debate on corporate 
governance centres on the responsibilities that businesses have and owe to the 
community. The two-holds on independent non-executive directors as business 
advisers and watchdogs need to be seen in balance. This is particularly important as 
greater understanding is to be achieved and independent non-executive directors are 
engaged throughout listed companies.  
Li (1994) stated that for a corporate board to be powerful governance, the 
tools of expertise, independence and legal power must be intrinsic in its structure. 
Therefore, the Finance Committee (1999) recommends that Malaysian quoted 
companies that have one-third of board should comprise independent directors. This, 
it was believed, would provide sufficient numbers to generate independent views that 
influence a board’s decisions. Independent directors have a vital role to play in both 
monitoring the performance and conduct of executive management, and in 
contributing to the strategic direction of a company.  
It is now widely accepted that independent non-executive directors have an 
important part to play in the proper running of the boards of listed companies. 
Furthermore, their contribution to the board’s deliberations has also become an area 
of keen interest for researchers.  
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2.3 Agency Theory 
Good corporate governance should enable owners to exercise control over 
management (e.g Jensen & Meckling, 1976; Fama & Jensen, 1883; Eisenhardt, 1989, 
as cited in Randoy & Goel, 2003). This is made clear by Jensen and Meckling (1976) 
in their agency theory which highlights the inherent conflict in interest between the 
owners (principal) of a company and its management (agent). This conflict occurs 
when the agent responds to incentives, and will not always act in the best interests of 
the principal. The agency theory thus emphasizes that managers of firms conduct 
businesses following ethics that are in the best interests of their shareholders (owners) 
(Othman, 2003).  
Weir’s (1997) suggestion that an effective board of directors can protect 
shareholders’ interests is actually an important form of check and balance. An 
efficient board that ensures effective top management will thus stimulate shareholder 
wealth and earnings that are comparable to the earnings of shareholders to the 
shareholders of similar firms. Clearly, appropriate internal control and monitoring 
mechanisms are essential to foster shareholder wealth.  
To ensure good corporate governance, Clarke (1998) referred emphatically to 
the Cadbury Report’s recommendations concerning non-executives directors. They 
should make independent judgments on issues of strategy, performances, resources, 
key appointments and standards of conduct. Indeed, the existence of relatively 
independent non-executive directors in the board will strengthen and influence 
decisions. Hence, well aligned and successful monitoring mechanisms will therefore 
improve the company’s performance. Nevertheless, not only will discretionary 
activities diminish but shareholders’ returns will increase (Weir, 1997). On the basis 
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of this evaluation, the existence of independent non-executive directors on the board 
will reduce agency cost and enhance independent judgment on the corporate board.   
 
2.4 Determinants of Boards’ Independence  
According to PricewaterhouseCoopers (2000), a board’s composition is fundamental 
to its effectiveness. Boards need to have a degree of independence from management, 
have the right people at the table and be of manageable size to function well. Fama 
and Jensen (1983) maintain that outside directors are effective monitors of 
management because of strong need to keep intact their reputation as good, 
independent decision makers. The Finance Committee (1999) recommended that 
boards of listed companies be comprised of one-third of independent non-executive 
directors with no fewer than two outsiders. The ‘green book’ defines the term 
“independent” under rule 9 of the Listing Requirements as follows – 
“The composition of the board of directors should reflect the ownership 
structure of the company. Every listed company should have 
independent directors, that is, directors that are not officers of the 
company; who are neither related to its officers nor represent 
concentrated or family holdings of its shares; who, in the view of the 
company’s board of directors, represent the interest of public 
shareholders, and are free of any relationship that would interfere with 
the exercise of independent judgment ”.          (FCCG, pg. 82) 
 
According to Lechem (2003), an independent director should be independent 
from management and free from any relationship which could interfere with the 
exercise of independent judgment. Matolscy, Stokes and Wright (2004) support this 
stand. They state that corporate governance would weaken if inside directors 
dominated the board. However, stronger governance would prevail if a board is 
dominated by outsiders as outside directors do not depend on the CEO for their future 
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income. In fact, because outside directors have the additional role of monitoring 
governance, they can replace weak links of senior management, particularly the CEO. 
  
2.5 Why the Argument over Independence? 
Weir et al. (2001) claimed that non-executive directors must be are independent 
directors if there is to be effective monitoring. Therefore, any non-executive directors 
who is, for example, a retired ex-director or those who work for a firm that provides 
service to the company cannot be considered independent non-executive directors. 
Moreover, O’Sullivan and Wong (1999) stated that non-executive directors 
who have served many years on the same board can become less effective as they 
tend to establish close relations with executive directors. This supports Cadbury’s 
claim that a non-executive director’s independence may diminish as his board tenure 
increases. 
Finally, non-executive directors cannot be effective in their monitoring role it 
they are not independent and unable to exercise independent judgment. This will be 
especially possible if an executive director becomes a non-executive director of the 
same company after retirement (Weir et al., 2001). Thus, the presence of non-
executive directors on a board cannot be regarded as giving some form of guarantee 
of either performance or absence of fraud. On the other hand, Eng et al. (2003) have 
suggested that outside directors who are not so close to management are capable of 
encouraging firms to disclose more information to outside investors. As such, it is 
important to have independent non-executive directors on the board to evaluate and 
enhance better performance.    
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2.6 Ownership Structure in Malaysia 
According to La-Porta, Lopez and Shleifer (1999), Malaysian firms were highly 
concentrated. By and large, the owners were also usually the directors of the company 
(Cheah & Chu, 2004). Thillainathan (1999) also identified concentration in ownership 
in Malaysia. Moreover, Cheah et al. (2004) added with this large shareholder 
structure, it often allows cross holdings and pyramid structure to exist and controls 
other firms without high financial outlays. 
 In the Malaysian perspective, shareholding in Malaysian PLCs is concentrated 
by different structures namely, family, state, widely held financial institutions and 
corporations, foreign institutions and of course blockholder and managerial 
ownerships. According to Thillainathan (1999), 85 percent of the PLCs had owner-
managers in that the post of the CEO, Board Chairman or Vice Chairman were either 
a member of the controlling family or an employee drawn from the ranks of the 
controlling shareholders. 
 
2.7 Independent Non-Executive Directors and Performances 
Ghosh and Sirmans (2003) suggested that one important mechanism designed to 
reduce agency problems is the appointment of independent directors on the corporate 
board. Both empirical and theoretical analyses suggest that outside members on the 
board of directors serve a critical role in the monitoring and disciplining of senior 
managers, and thereby influencing firm performance. Fama et al. (1983) also contend 
that monitoring managerial opportunism become more effective with a higher 
proportion of outside directors. 
There have been a number of studies which analyze the relationship between 
independent directors and firm performance. It is arguable that the overall role of 
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independent non-executive directors is to monitor the management. Thus, the 
proportion of independent non-executive directors on a board should be positively 
related to firm performance.  
However, the empirical evidence shows a mixed relationship. Laing and Weir 
(1999) noted that board comprising a majority of non-executive directors does not 
necessarily result in better performance as compared to executive directors 
dominating the board. There is no evidence that shows increased non-executive 
director representation results in increased on firm performance. This finding is also 
supported by Fosberg (1989), who found that there was no relationship between the 
POD (proportion of outside directors) and the various variables used to gauge 
managerial performance (return on equity, average return on equity, sales). It also put 
forth that there are no significant differences between the mean value of return on 
equity of firm with, or without, POD. However, Bhagat and Black (2000) also have 
supported evidence that the result shows that firms suffering from low profitability 
respond by increasing the independence of their board of directors. 
In the Malaysian context, research carried by Abdullah (2004) and Othman 
(2003) found a negative relationship between the board’s independence and firm 
performance. Using data 1994-1996, Abdullah (2004) found that the board’s 
independence and the CEO’s duality, either singly, or jointly, did not relate to firm 
performance. A similar study done by Othman (2003) found the relationship between 
the number of independent non-executive directors on the board and return on asset 
(ROA) showed negative but insignificant signs. 
On the other hand, Schellenger, Wood, and Tashakori (1989) in their study 
found a direct and positive relationship between independent non executive directors 
and corporate financial performance. Also their findings indicate that the presence of 
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independent non-executive directors on corporate boards enhanced the firm’s market 
performance. Similarly, Hutchinson (2002) found that a higher proportion of outside 
directors on the boards of high growth firms are associated with the firm’s higher 
performance based on the accounting rate of return on equity measure.  
Moreover, Taub (2004) and Uzun, Szewczyk, and Varma (2004) reveal that 
the higher proportion of independent outside directors is associated with less 
likelihood of corporate wrongdoing. Besides, Chen and Jaggi, (2000) also found a 
positive relationship between the proportion of independent non-executive directors 
and comprehensiveness of financial disclosures. They believe that independent 
directors are essential to monitor the boards’ activities, and to improve the 
transparency of corporate boards.     
A recent study by Bonn (2004) on board structure and firm performance 
revealed that the proportion of outside directors on the board is positively associated 
with the firm’s performance. The results of the study suggest that outside directors 
can effectively monitor and influence the management. Moreover, Rosenstein and 
Wyatt (1990) also contend that the firm’s value increased if outside director were 
included to the board improved the firm’s value. Baysinger and Butler (1985) concede 
with this as they have evidence shows that firm’s performance increased if more 
outsiders were included in the board. In the Malaysian context, none of the studies has 
so far looked into the relationship between independent non-executive directors and 
firm performance after the amendments of one-third of board consist independent 
directors by the Malaysian Code on Corporate Governance (2001). Again, existing 
independent directors will monitor better to improve the transparency of corporate 
boards and subsequently influence firm performance. Therefore, based on the above 
 16 
arguments, the higher the proportion of independent non-executive directors on the 
corporate board will result in the greater firm performance. 
 
2.8 Managerial Ownership and Performances  
Managerial ownership plays an important role in the corporate governance literature. 
Previous studies reveal that managerial ownership influences a firm’s performance 
(Barnhart et al., 1998; Han, Lee & Suk, 1998; Agrawal & Knoeber, 1996). Chen 
(2001) has supported evidence that the management ownership variable has a positive 
coefficient in the corporate performance regression. Companies that are totally owned 
by managers do especially well. Taking into account that a relatively small proportion 
of shares are held by the management, it is possible that raising such a proportion 
might significantly strengthen the management’s incentive to improve the firm’s 
performance.  
 However, empirical evidence on the relationship between managerial 
ownership and firm performance is mixed across nations. Interestingly, the nonlinear 
relationship between managerial ownership and firm performance (Tobin’s Q) is well 
accepted. Mueller and Spitz (2001) propound that managerial ownership shares up to 
around 80 percent render a positive effect on a firm’s performance. However, 
negative effects take place thereafter. Hermalin and Weisbach (1991) also posit 
evidence that at managerial levels less than one percent, the Tobin’s Q increases with 
ownership. But a level greater than 20 percent, Tobin’s Q decreases with ownership.  
The studies by Morck et al. (1988) also posited similar evidence as above. 
They found positive and negative relationships between managerial ownership levels 
and a firm’s values. The positive effect reflects the convergence of interest effect. As 
managerial equity increases, managers are likely to coincide more closely with those 
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outside shareholders’ interests. As ownership increases beyond certain levels, there 
are negative effects on the firm’s value; this reflects an entrenchment of interest 
effect. Here, the managers tend to be entrenched, as they are less interested in the 
welfare of their shareholders.  
Leung et al. (2004) found similar evidence concerning director ownership and 
voluntary segment disclosure. In the study showed that voluntary segment disclosure 
increases as director ownership increases from 1 percent to 25 percent. However, the 
disclosure decreases as ownership rises above 25 percent as a result of conflict of 
interest between the controlling and minority shareholders. Therefore, at a high level 
of managerial ownership, the alignment is attenuated and the agency problem moves 
from the managers/ shareholders.  
 In the Malaysian studies, local researchers found similar evidence. Mat Nor, 
Said, and Redzuan (1999) using cross section data, stated Tobin’s Q, earnings per 
share (EPS) and price earnings ratio (P/E) increase for the board ownership range of 0 
percent and 5 percent, decrease as ownership rises between 5 percent and 25 percent, 
(statistically significantly for Tobin’s Q, and P/E), and then continues to increase 
(expect for P/E) as board ownership increases beyond 25 percent. This evidence is 
also supported by studies done by Ali and Sanda (2001). They established that 
ownership significantly influenced performance, increasing at early levels of board 
ownership and decreasing at the levels of ownership beyond 36.7 percent of a firm’s 
equity. Hence, this study expects to show that there is a non-linear relationship 
between managerial ownership and firm performance.  
 
 
 
 18 
2.9 Board Composition, Managerial Ownership, and Firm Performance  
Internal control in public companies is delegated by shareholders to a board of 
directors, although generally they retain approval rights over such matters as board 
memberships. The board then delegates most decision management and control 
functions to internal agents. Agency problems arise when decisions are made which 
are inconsistent with shareholders’ interests. These problems are addressed in the 
governance structure by separating decision management (initiation and 
implementation of decisions) and decision control (ratification and monitoring of 
decisions). Decision control is the corporate boards’ primary function, and outside 
director have the particular responsibility of advocating shareholder interests. 
Previous research documented that relationship between managerial 
ownership and board composition is essential in corporate governance structure. A 
number of empirical studies show some argument over the relations between 
managerial ownership and board compositions towards firm performances. 
Weisbach (1988) put forth that the relationship between managerial turnover 
and performance is stronger within companies with outsiders-dominated boards. His 
findings recognize the importance and monitoring effectiveness of outside directors. 
Rosenstein and Wyatt (1997) suggested that in the moderate inside ownership level (5 
percent- 25 percent), where inside ownership reduces agency problem between 
manager and outside shareholders, it appears that the balance of inside and outside 
directors is essential, with a new insider more valuable than an outsider-dominated 
board. They added that managerial ownership dominated board composition is an 
effective tool for aligning managerial and shareholder’s interests. Denis and Sarin 
(1999) particularly emphasized that inside ownership is conversely correlated to the 
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proportion of outside directors. Consequently, the effectiveness of outside directors 
monitoring the board is depends on the degree of managerial ownership levels.  
Brickley and James (1987) advocate that outside directors in the banking 
industry tend to decrease managerial consumption of perquisites. Peng et al. (2003) 
has also established in their study that when outsider directors interact with 
supervisory and/or executive board(s) and a new CEO, it affects performance 
positively. Therefore, if the boards are effective in controlling agency problems and 
ensuring that management decisions are consistent with enhancing shareholder value, 
this should result in better corporate performance.  
However, it is likely for high managerial ownership firms to have weaker 
board independence. According to Leung et al. (2004), when managerial ownership is 
higher, the controlling owners will have more voting power or influence to decide on 
structure of the outside directors on the board. Consequently, this will be significant 
in appointing independent non-executive directors. Clearly, the preceding discussions 
imply that the proportion of independent non-executive directors in many managerial 
ownership levels effect performance. This leads to the final hypothesis, the interaction 
effects between the higher proportion of independent non-executive directors and 
different levels of managerial ownership have an impact on firm performance. 
 
2.10 Dependent Variable 
The dependent variable is the firm’s performance. Based on the literature review, 
Tobin’s Q is the most commonly used performance measures. 
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2.10.1 Tobin's Q 
The Tobin’s Q is a measure of market performance and computed as (market 
value of equity + total liabilities) divided by total assets.  The Q ratio was used as a 
measure of managerial performance on the basis that well-managed companies that 
make profitable investment should have Q ratios greater than 1, while poorly 
managed companies are likely to have ratios less than 1 (Peirson, Brown, Easton, & 
Howard, 2003). This measure feasible with cross sectional data instead of time series, 
as inflation greatly influences the approximation of total assets’ replacement costs 
(Chen, 2001). This measurement approach is similar to Cheah et al., (2004); Welch 
(2003); Chen (2001); Barnhart, Marr and Rosenstein, (1994) and Morck et al. (1988) 
who examine the relationship between governance structure and firm performance.   
 
2.11 Control Variables 
To better examine the effects of independent non-executive directors and managerial 
ownership on firm performance, the study used control variables namely, firm size, 
leverage and board size that may affect the firms’ performance. By controlling these 
variables, it is believed that there is some impact on the relationship between 
independent non-executive directors and managerial ownership on firm performance. 
This study used three control variables because previous studies proved that these 
variables significantly affect the firm’s performance.   
 
2.11.1 Firm Size 
Firm size has long been accepted in corporate governance research. This study 
uses the natural logarithm of total assets as proxy for the size of a firm as in Chen, 
2001; Barnhart et al. (1998); and Hermalin et al. (1991). A number of empirical 
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literatures have investigated the relation between size and firm performances. The 
inclusion of firm size as a control variable in this study is provoked by the fact that it 
has been found to be related with various firm characteristics. Lang and Stulz (1994) 
find a negative correlation between firm size and Tobin’s Q. Himmelberg, Hubbard 
and Palia (1999) propound that the larger firm suffers greater monitoring and agency 
costs. Besides, larger firms tend to employ more skilled managers, who become 
wealthier. This indicates a higher level of managerial ownership. In addition, large 
firms accrue the potential economies of scale and scope (Bonn, 2004).     
 
2.11.2 Leverage 
This study uses long-term liability divided by total assets as a proxy of 
leverage level. According to Othman (2003), this ratio indicates how firms choose to 
finance operations. Thus, the lower the ratio, the greater the protection for lenders, 
who rank before shareholders. According to Whited (1992), small firms cannot avail 
themselves to long-term debt markets since their growth will be more than their 
collateralizable assets. Moreover, Titman and Wessels (1988) assert that capital 
structure is easily accessible to larger firms. Morck et al. (1988) contend that 
managers from the more influential firms may hold a slightly high equity for the same 
Tobin’s Q. Welch (2003) further propound that firm influence lead to a measure of 
monitoring by credit providers. This may decrease the need for additional monitoring 
granted by concentrated ownership. Agency theory foresees that the board’s 
effectiveness would grow as the extent of leverage rises. This in turn would increase 
the firm’s performance.  
 
 
 22 
2.11.3 Board Size 
Yermack (1996) used board size as a measure of board cohesiveness. Board 
size is measured as the total number of directors on the board. Usually, larger firms 
tend to have larger boards, compared to small firms. Studies done by Lipton and 
Lorsch (1992); Jensen (1993) and Yermack (1996), found an inverse relationship 
between board size and firm value. They found firms achieve highest market value 
when boards are small. Bone (2004) proffers that boards with small numbers will 
probably agree on outcomes and engage in actual interaction and debate. However, 
larger boards will face a lack of cohesiveness, coordination difficulties and 
fractionalization which will result serious consequences. Moreover, Matolcsy et al. 
(2004) emphasized that companies with larger boards can better counteract the effects 
of poor decision-making by surmounting the partiality against high-risk projects. 
Conversely, companies with smaller boards are likely to gain more profit. Therefore, 
board size can affect the value-relevance of outside directors.  
 
2.12 Theoretical Framework 
Theoretical framework of the study is shown in Figure 2.1. The study proposes that 
proportion of independent non-executive directors and managerial ownership will 
influences firm performances. In addition, the study also examined whether the 
interaction between the proportion of independent non-executive directors and 
managerial ownership will have an impact on firm performance. Firm size, leverage 
and board size will serve as control variables. The above relationships are depicted in 
a schematic diagram as given below;  
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Figure 2.1: Theoretical Framework 
 
2.13 Hypotheses Development  
The hypothesis development in this study is based on the agency theory framework. 
Theoretically, boards of directors consists insider and outside directors are argued to 
play a vital role in influencing firm’s performance. Nevertheless, pervious findings 
show mixed results of positive and negative relationships between independent non-
executive directors and managerial ownership towards firm performance. In this 
study, four hypotheses are constructed. This will be explained as followings. 
 
2.13.1 Independent Non-Executive Directors 
Having an independent director on the boards will enhance the effectiveness 
of monitoring function and ensure that management is not running the company for 
their own personal interest. However, previous researches, found a mixed relationship 
between independent non-executive directors and firm value. Abdullah (2004); 
Othman (2003); Bhagat et al. (2000) and Fosberg (1989) found negative relationship 
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Firm Size Leverage 
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between the board of independence and firm performances. On the other hand, studies 
by Bonn (2004); Hutchinson, (2002); Rosenstein et al. (1990); Schellenger et al. 
(1989); and Baysinger (1985) found inclusion of independent directors improved the 
firm’s value. Thus, existing independent directors will be better monitoring and 
enhance firm performance. Therefore, based on the literatures, it is hypothesize that: 
 
Hypothesis 1: 
 
The higher the proportions of independent non-executive directors 
on corporate board, the greater the firm performance. 
 
2.13.2 Managerial ownership 
Study done by Jensen et al. in 1976 found the firm value is positively 
correlated with the level of managerial ownership. However, Mueller et al. (2001); 
Hermalin et al. (1991); Morck et al. (1988) and Wong et al. (1991) in their studies 
show that the relationship between firm performance and managerial ownership is not 
linear. Similar evidence reported by Ali et al. (2001) and Mat Nor et al. (1999) in 
Malaysian scenario. Therefore, it is hypothesize that: 
 
Hypothesis 2: 
 
There is a non-linear relationship between managerial ownership 
and firm performance. 
 
2.13.3 Board Composition and Managerial Ownership 
Previous study has recognized that relationship between managerial ownership 
and board compositions is vital in corporate governance structure. A number of 
empirical studies show some argument over the relations between managerial 
ownership and board compositions towards firm performances. Rosenstein et al. 
